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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 General Introduction 
 
The criminalization of accidental pollution has its background in a proposal from the 
European Commission to establish a European fund to supplement the international regime 
for liability and compensation for oil pollution damage. 
 
During the European Commissions Communication on the safety of seaborne oil trade of 
21 March 2000 it was noted that the existing international liability and compensation 
regime for oil pollution had a number of shortcomings. The Commission addressed in 
particular the inadequacy of the limits for compensation as claims produced by recent 
incidents, most notably the Erika incident in December 1999, exceeded the maximum 
amount of compensation available from the 1992 Fund.1-2 Thus the Commission produced 
a proposal to establish a European fund3 supplementing the existing international regime. 
This fund would serve as a third tier and compensate victims that would be unable to obtain 
full compensation under the international regime.  
 
The Commission also considered the threshold for the ship owner’s right to limit their 
liability to be a major shortcoming.4 In order to break the ship owner’s right to limitation it 
must be proven that the damage “resulted from his personal act or omission, committed 
with the intent to cause damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would 
probably result.” 5 The Commission regarded the test of liability as unassailable and argued 
that the ship owner should face a greater exposure to unlimited liability due to “… the 
                                                 
1 EC document, COM (2000) 142 final.  
2 1992 Fund Convention.  
3 EC document, COM (2000) 802 final. 
4 Ibid. Pp. 53-59. 
5 1992 Civil Liability Convention art. V 2.  
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extraordinary risks involved in the transport of oil by sea …”.6 The Commission therefore 
proposed to expose established grossly negligent behaviour by any person involved in the 
transport of oil at sea to both civil and criminal sanctions.7  
 
These signals from the EC were discussed by the IOPC Funds8 which decided to raise the 
financial limits of the regime in 2000 by 50,73%9 and, in 2003, implemented a third tier of 
compensation10 bringing the financial limit approximately level with the proposed limit for 
the COPE fund. Thus the, in the Commissions view, most important shortcoming was 
accounted for. However, the 2000 amendments and Supplementary Fund do not address the 
issue concerning the standard of liability and the issue of criminalization.   
 
Consequently the Commission presented a proposal for a directive on the protection of the 
environment through criminal law in order to introduce sanctions they considered adequate 
and sufficiently dissuasive.11  In serious cases of pollution damage caused with intent or 
with serious negligence, the criminal sanctions could involve deprivation of liberty.12 Being 
at EU-level this system would complement the international regime for civil liability and 
compensation for pollution damage.13 
 
                                                 
6 EU document, COM (2000) 802 final p. 56. 
7 EU document, COM (2000) 142 final para. 5.d.iv) and COM (2000) 802 final p. 61. Article 10 of the COPE 
fund provided that the member states could impose penal sanctions on any person involved in oil transport by 
sea “…for established grossly negligent conduct.” 
8 The International Oil Pollution Funds. 
9 Resulution to amend the 1992 CLC; Resolution to amend the 1992 Fund Convention. See IOPC Funds 
document,  92FUND/A.5/INF.1 para 1 and 92FUND/A.5/INF.1 Annex I and II.  
10 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol. See IOPC Funds document, 92/FUND/A.8/4 Annex I.  
11 EU document COM (2001) 139 final as modified by COM (2002) 544 final. See Justification, under the 
Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal. 
12 EU document, COM (2001) 139 final p. 6 para (8).  
 13 EU document, COM (2003) 92 final. 
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In July 2005 the EU adopted a council framework decision14 for the implementation of the 
abovementioned directive,15 which was adopted in September 2005 
 
The Directive caused much controversy, particularly within the shipping industry, and in 
2006 a case regarding the Directive’s validity was brought before the English High Court.16 
Accordingly the claimants invited the English High Court to grant permission to apply for a 
judicial review of the Directive and refer several questions concerning its validity to the 
European Court of Justice. The claimants presented four arguments contending the 
Directive’s invalidity of which all four was considered well-founded by the Court. 
Consequently the Court granted permission for a judicial review and referred the following 
questions to the ECJ (hereinafter the main questions). 
 
(1) In relation to straits used for international navigation, the Exclusive Economic 
Zone or equivalent zone of a member state and the high seas, is article 5(2) of 
Directive 2005/35/EC invalid insofar as its limits the exceptions in Annex I 
regulation 11(b)17 of MARPOL 73/78 and in Annex II regulation (6) (b) of 
MARPOL 73/78 to the owners, masters and crew? 
 
(2) In relation to the territorial sea of a member state: 
 
                                                 
14 Council Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA.  
15 Directive 2005/35/EC. 
16 High Court of Justice Queen’s Bench Division Administrative Court, International Association of 
Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO), The International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners 
(INTERCARGO), The Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee, Lloyd’s Register, The International Salvage 
Union v. The Secretary of State for Transport, Case No: CO/10651/2005.  
17 In the revised annex I of MARPOL (IMO document MEPC 52/24/Add.2 containing the revised text of 
annex I of MARPOL (2004)) the enumeration of the regulations has changed (e.g. regulation 11 is now 
regulation 4). However, as both the INTERTANKO and others v. The Secretary of State for Transport case 
and Directive 2005/35/EC refers to the old annex I, the old annex I is referred to throughout this dissertation.    
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a) Is article 4 of the Directive invalid insofar as it requires member states to 
treat serious negligence as a test of liability for discharge of polluting 
substances; and/or 
 
b) Is article 5 (1) of the Directive invalid insofar as it excludes the 
application of the exceptions in Annex I regulation 11 (b) of MARPOL 
73/78 and in annex II regulation (6) (b) of MARPOL 73/78? 
 
(3) Does article 4 of the Directive, requiring member states to adopt national 
legislation which includes serious negligence as a standard of liability and which 
penalizes discharges in the territorial sea, breach the right of innocent passage 
recognized by the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, and if so, is 
article 4 invalid to that extent?  
 
(4) Does the use of the phrase “serious negligence” in article 4 of the Directive 
infringe the principle of legal certainty, and if so, is article invalid to that extent? 
 
1.2 Objectives and Structure 
 
The objective of this dissertation is to examine the relationship between the Directive and 
international law without reference to EU law in particular. Thus main question 4 will not 
be examined and the Directive will, in most instances, be dealt with as if it was legislation 
adopted on the national level. 
 
The starting point for the discussions in this paper is the main questions 1, 2, and 3 with 
reference to the claimant’s and Mensah’s arguments. All questions raise issues that neither 
INTERTANKO and others (hereinafter the claimants) nor Mensah deal with throughout 
their argumentation. Thus, the discussions depart from what seems to be the intended scope 
of the main questions. This was found necessary in order to cover as many aspects as 
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possible and to provide an, as complete as possible, examination of the Directive in relation 
to MARPOL and UNCLOS.  
 
Section 2 provides an overview of  UNCLOS, MARPOL, and the Directive, and deals with 
general issues that are common to the main questions. Therefore, the issues discussed in 
these sections will be dealt with without reference to any of the main questions in 
particular.  
 
Main question 1 is examined in section 3. In subsection 3.1 three issues common to main 
question 1 are examined while subsections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 deal with prescriptive and 
enforcement jurisdiction with respect to straits and the EEZ. The distinction between 
prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction is not upheld with respect to the high seas as 
these topics are interrelated to a larger extent than with respect to straits and the EEZ. 
 
Section 4.1 deals with main question 3. The foremost question raised here is whether the 
article 4 of the Directive raises the question of innocent passage. This is first examined in 
general then in relation to prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction in subsections 4.1.2 
and 4.1.3 
 
Section 4.2 deals with main question 2 which is divided into sub-questions 2 (a) and 2 (b). 
These questions require additional clarification the distinction between them is therefore 
examined in subsection 4.2.1. The enforcement issues raised in relation to questions 2 (a) 
and 2 (b) are dealt with in under question 2 (a), while issues regarding prescriptive 
jurisdiction is covered in subsections 4.3 and 4.4.   
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1.3 Methodology  
 
1.3.1 The relevant sources of international law and their application in relation to 
the dissertation 
 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice is widely recognized as an 
authoritative statement of relevant sources of international law, although not representing 
an exhaustive list of sources.18 According to article 38 the primary sources are international 
conventions, international custom and general principles of law,19 while “… judicial 
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations 
[serve as] subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”20 
 
As most issues examined in this dissertation are regulated by provisions in either MARPOL 
or UNCLOS or both, these conventions serve as the main sources of international law. 
Considering that UNCLOS codifies and represents much of the international customary law 
in respect of the law of the sea,21 international custom is not as important to the topics of 
this paper as it is to other fields of international law. This is also the case regarding judicial 
decisions as judgements by international courts concerning marine pollution by ships are 
sparse and none of the ICJ and ITLOS22 decisions has had any direct bearing on the 
examination of the main issues of this paper. On the other hand are the ‘teachings of 
publicists’ important to the arguments presented in this dissertation, both due to the lack of 
other sources and the number of such writings covering a broad range of issues. However, 
accounting for article 38 (1) (d) of the ICJ Statute, the subsidiary nature of this source 
                                                 
18 Brownlie (2003) p. 5; Ruud, Ulfstein and Fauchald (1997) p. 16.   
19 The ICJ Statutes art. 38 (1) (a), (b) and (c).  
20 Ibid. (d).  
21 See Churchill and Lowe (1999) p. 9.  
22 Only 13 cases have been before the ITLOS and 7 of these are prompt release cases. See 
<http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html> 
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makes a conclusion uncertain if based on arguments derived from writings alone. 
Considering the scarcity of the other sources, the writings of publicists will serve as an 
important source of international law, but predominantly as a factor for the interpretation of 
the primary sources. 
 
1.3.2 Interpretation of MARPOL and UNCLOS 
 
According to the Vienna Convention article 31 the focal point of all treaty interpretation is 
the terms of the treaty within their ordinary meaning23 and “… in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose.24 Article 32 stipulates that recourse may be had to, inter 
alia, preparatory works as a supplementary means of interpretation in order to “… confirm 
the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31 …” or when the interpretation 
according to article 31 either “… (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads 
to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. However, due to the supplementary 
nature of article 32 and the focus on ‘fidelity to the text’ in article 31 a teleological 
approach is probably undue, at least in respect of MARPOL and UNCLOS.25 This is in line 
with the view that the intentions of the parties shall be accounted for, not as an independent 
basis of interpretation, but as expressed in the text.26  
 
                                                 
23 As the ordinary meaning is to be given to the terms the intentions of the authors are accounted for as 
expressed in the text, and not as an independent basis of interpretation. See Brownlie (2003) p. 602; Noyes 
(2002) p. 368. 
24 Vienna Convention 1969 art. 31 (1).  
25 Noyes (2002) p. 370; Brownlie, (2003) p. 607, argues, in respect of treaty interpretation in general, that “… 
the teleological approach, with its aspect of judicial legislation, may be thought to have a constructive role to 
play” in certain situations. Ruud, Ulfstein and Fauchald, (1997) p. 57, submit that, according to articles 31 
and 32 of the Vienna Convention, the objective, subjective, and teleological approach are equally important.  
26 According to Brownlie, (2003) p. 602, this view was taken by the Institute of International Law, the 
International Law Commission and the ICJ before being codified by the Vienna Convention.    
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Article 31 (3) (b) of the Vienna Convention 1969 indicates that state practise can be a 
relevant factor in the interpretation of treaties.27 Individual state practise is referred to 
where such practise is found to shed light over the discussed issue and/or an unclear treaty 
provision. In addition some arguments are supported on the preparatory works of 
MARPOL in order to clarify certain ambiguities. However, recourse to the preparatory 
works will be limited as they are considered to be supplementary to the text and should 
only be used as a factor for interpreting under certain circumstances.28 
2 Legal context  
 
There are several issues concerning UNCLOS, MARPOL, and the Directive that are 
common to main questions 1, 2, and 3. These issues will be dealt with in the following in 
order to establish a foundation for the further examination of main questions 1, 2, and 3 and 
to avoid repetition. 
 
2.1 General remarks concerning UNCLOS and the jurisdiction of states over 
vessel-source pollution 
 
Part XII of UNCLOS lays down a general and comprehensive legal framework for the 
“Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment”29 as it applies throughout the 
marine environment and covers all sources of pollution.30 Accordingly, the provisions 
dealing with vessel-source pollution are mainly found in part XII and to a lesser extent in 
                                                 
27 See also Ruud, Ulfstein and Fauchald, (1997) p. 30.  
28 The Vienna Convention 1969 art. 32.  
29 The title of part XII. See Kwiatkowska (1989) p. 160.  
30 Kwiatkowska (1989) p. 160; Molenaar (1998) p. 51.   
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parts II-VII dealing specifically with the different maritime zones.31  In general these rules 
provide that, with respect to foreign ships in transit through the maritime zones, states may 
exercise limited prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction that increases “… in proportion 
to the geographical proximity of the zone in question to the coastal state.”32 
 
Ships navigating the high seas are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state save 
in “… exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in 
[UNCLOS]…”.33 Even though the flag state enjoys exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas 
all ships are required by articles 94 (5) and 211 (2) to comply with generally accepted rules 
and standards (hereinafter GAIRS).   
 
With respect to the exclusive economic zone (hereinafter EEZ) coastal state prescriptive 
jurisdiction is limited to conforming and giving effect to GAIRS.34 Coastal enforcement 
jurisdiction in the EEZ is limited by UNCLOS article 220 (3, 5, and 6) depending on 
various criteria concerning the magnitude of the damage and level of obtained evidence. 
 
In international straits the strait state has the competence to prescribe navigational 
measures35 and to “… adopt laws and regulations relating to transit passage […] by giving 
effect to applicable international regulations.”36 The only provision that deals specifically 
with strait state enforcement jurisdiction is UNCLOS article 233. According to article 233 
the strait state is allowed to take ‘appropriate measures’ if a foreign ship has violated “… 
the laws and regulations referred to in article 42 [(1) (a and b)], causing or threatening 
major damage to the marine environment of the straits …”.37 
                                                 
31 The contiguous zone will not be dealt with as the Directive does not address this zone.   
32 Ringbom (2006) p. 206. 
33 UNCLOS art. 92 (1). As examined in subsection 3.3, article 218 of UNCLOS represents the only exception 
relevant to this paper.  
34 UNCLOS art. 211 (5).  
35 UNCLOS art. 42 (1) (a). 
36 UNCLOS art 42 (1) and (1) (b). 
37 UNCLOS art. 233.  
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The overall premise of the territorial sea is that the sovereignty of a coastal state extends to 
the territorial sea.38 However, coastal state prescriptive jurisdiction is limited to give effect 
to GAIRS with respect to “… design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign ships 
…”39 (hereinafter CDEM). In the territorial sea coastal state enforcement jurisdiction is 
limited by the regime of innocent passage. With respect to ships in innocent passage 
enforcement jurisdiction is limited by UNCLOS article 220 (2, 3, 5, and 6), while with 
respect to ships in non-innocent passage the coastal state enjoys complete jurisdiction.40 
In addition the obligation not to discriminate and not to hamper innocent passage laid down 
in article 24 applies to both prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction.41  
 
Within the internal waters the state has full jurisdiction which implies a right to set 
conditions for access to its ports and may require compliance with its requirements.42  
However, restrictions to state jurisdiction within the internal waters follow “…from 
principles of general international, such as the prohibition of discrimination or of abuse of 
right,”43 and restrictions may follow from treaty commitments and proportionality 
requirements.44 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 UNCLOS art. 2.  
39 UNCLOS art 21 (2).  
40 Ringbom (2006)  pp. 207-208.  
41 Hakapää (1981) pp. 190 and 196; Molenaar (1998) p. 201. Article 211 (4) reaffirms the obligation not to 
hamper innocent passage with respect to prescriptive jurisdiction. See subsections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3.  
42 UNCLOS arts. 25 (2) and 211 (3). Ringbom (2006) p. 208.  See also Hakapää (1981) p. 169; Molenaar 
(1998) pp. 185-186.  
43 Ringbom (2006) p. 208. 
44 Ibid. 
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2.2 On MARPOL and the jurisdictional interplay between MARPOL and UNCLOS 
 
There are several issues concerning MARPOL and the jurisdictional interplay between 
MARPOL and UNCLOS that are common to both questions 1 and 2 and have a bearing on 
question 3. These issues will be dealt with under the chapeau ‘the issue of residual 
jurisdiction.’  
 
2.2.1 The issue of residual jurisdiction 
 
The question raised here is whether state parties to MARPOL are left with a margin of 
discretion in exercising jurisdiction under MARPOL and, if so, the extent of residual 
jurisdiction.45 This is necessary to examine as the claimants has to a certain degree built 
their case on the assumption that MARPOL sets a fixed and binding set of rules that 
national legislation can not depart from.46  
 
First it should be mentioned that regulatory conventions such as MARPOL are first and 
foremost concerned with technical rather than jurisdictional issues. This common feature is 
probably due to the uncertainty47 concerning coastal state jurisdiction at the time the major 
regulatory conventions where adopted.48 Nevertheless, MARPOL contains provisions 
which deal with jurisdictional aspects.  
 
Article 4 (2) of MARPOL requires coastal states to prohibit any violation of the 
Convention within its jurisdiction, which includes an obligation to prohibit any violation of 
the rules and standards laid down in the annexes to MARPOL as they are binding in their 
                                                 
45 See Molenaar (1997) p. 202.  
46 INTERTANKO and others v. The Secretary of State for Transport paras. 29-35.  
47 This is elaborated below.  
48 E.g. MARPOL and SOLAS. See Timagenis (1980) p. 486; Molenaar (1997) p. 202.  
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entirety.49 The mandatory nature of the phrase ‘to prohibit any violation of the Convention’ 
implies both a minimum and maximum level of prescriptive jurisdiction and under the 
under the assumption that the standards in MARPOL represent the maximum level of 
coastal state prescriptive jurisdiction one can hardly argue that the coastal state retains 
residual jurisdiction.50 Accordingly Molenaar upholds that article 4 (2) does not provide a 
basis for unilateral prescriptive jurisdiction, a conclusion in concurrence with the 
claimant’s and Mensah’s view.51 Notwithstanding this, Boyle asserts that article 4(2) of 
MARPOL does not debar coastal states from adopting stricter standards52 as the coastal 
state “… enjoys a substantial measure of national discretion.” 53 In order to agree with 
Boyle’s conclusion one must examine article 4 (2) in a broader context. 
 
The relationship between MARPOL and UNCLOS provides guidance regarding the extent 
of coastal state jurisdiction and MARPOL. One could argue that principles such as the 
pacta sunt servanda principle54 and article 311 (2) of UNCLOS implies that UNCLOS 
cannot influence the rights and obligations of MARPOL, thus the coastal state retains no 
residual jurisdiction. The pacta sunt servanda principle requires the State parties to 
MARPOL to perform the Convention as agreed between the parties,55 and article 311 (2) 
provides that UNCLOS “… shall not alter the rights and obligations of States Parties which 
arise from other agreements compatible with this Convention and which do not affect the 
                                                 
49 MARPOL, art. 14 (1).  
50 Molenaar (1997) p.  203.  
51 Molenaar (1998) p.  210; Neither the claimants in the INTERTANKO and others v. The Secretary of State 
for Transport, nor Mensah, use the terms ‘maximum/minimum’ levels of coastal state jurisdiction. The 
claimants, para 35, consider MARPOL to provide “… a fixed, binding and uniform set of rules which cannot 
be departed from save by amendment of MARPOL [,]” while Mensah, (2005) p. 27, argues that “… there is 
no basis either in MARPOL or in UNCLOS for the claim that a coastal state has the power to enact laws that 
deviate from the parameters specified under international law.” 
52 Boyle (1985) p. 359 n. 71.  
53 Boyle (2006) p. 25.  
54 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art 26.  
55 Ibid.  
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enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights or the performance of their obligations 
under this Convention.”56 Furthermore, as mentioned, the claimants in the INTERTANKO 
and others v. The Secretary of State for Transport case, argue that national legislation 
cannot deviate from MARPOL rules as they constitute a “… fixed, binding and uniform set 
of rules.”57 Supporting this argument the claimants underline that the recitals of MARPOL 
provide that the rules established by MARPOL are meant to have a universal purport.58 
These arguments suggest that a coastal state does not retain any residual jurisdiction and 
therefore cannot depart from the set of rules laid down in MARPOL. Nevertheless, the 
drafting history and the text of MARPOL itself clearly indicate that UNCLOS was intended 
to be, and is, instrumental to the interpretation of MARPOL provisions.59  
 
During the 1973 Conference, which adopted MARPOL 73, there was much controversy 
concerning the question of jurisdiction60 and the conference considered proposals in 
relation to both prescriptive -and enforcement jurisdiction, but it proved difficult to attain a 
general consensus on either issue.61 The proposal on prescriptive jurisdiction62 failed to 
                                                 
56 UNCLOS, art 311 (2). See also Ringbom (1996) pp. 76-77.  
57 INTERTANKO and others v. The Secretary of State for Transport, para 35.  
58 INTERTANKO and others v. The Secretary of State for Transport, para. 36. 
59 Mensah, (2005) p. 27, recognizes this in the paper on which the claimants in the INTERTANKO and others 
v. The Secretary of State for Transport case rely, underlining that UNCLOS contains the overarching 
principles in which the provisions of the MARPOL 73/78 Convention are subject to. In addition he contends 
that UNCLOS provides general powers and rights that MARPOL 73/78 specifies within the framework 
provided by UNCLOS, but that the prescriptive jurisdiction conferred by MARPOL is subject to limitations 
in both the convention itself, and the over arching principles of UNCLOS. 
60 According to M’Gonigle and Zacher, (1979) p. 200, the development of the discussion on jurisdictional 
matters threatened to deprive flag states of the “… almost exclusive jurisdiction both to legislate standards 
that apply to their ships and to enforce these standards.”   
61Abecassis and Jarashow, (1985) pp. 92-93, observe that “… the question of jurisdiction was a key item on 
the agenda, and was keenly fought. M’Gonigle and Zacher, (1979) p. 206, goes further when stating that “… 
the success of the entire 1973 Conference hinged on the resolution of crucial jurisdictional issues.” See also 
Timagenis (1980) pp. 509-522.  
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obtain sufficient support in the Plenary and the draft article on prescriptive jurisdiction was 
subsequently deleted.63 On the issue of enforcement jurisdiction a compromise position 
was reached in regard of the Administration,64 port states65 and coastal states.66  
In respect of coastal state enforcement jurisdiction the final compromise reached at the 
1973 conference is laid down in the above-mentioned article 4 (2) and article 9. The latter 
provides that:  
 
“(2) Nothing in the present Convention shall prejudice the codification and 
development of the law of the sea by the United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea convened pursuant to Resolution 2750 C (XXV) of the General Assembly 
of the United Nations nor the present or future claims and legal views of any State 
concerning the law of the sea and the nature and extent of coastal and flag State 
jurisdiction. 
 
(3) The term ‘jurisdiction’ in the present Convention shall be construed in the 
light of international law in force at the time of application or interpretation of the 
present Convention.” 
  
                                                                                                                                                    
62 Pursuant to the proposed article 8, IMCO Doc. MP/CONF/C.1/WP.36, any contracting state could adopt 
more stringent measures in respect of discharge standards but not in respect of CDEM standards.  According 
to M’Gonigle and Zacher, (1979) p. 209, the proposed article 8 was accepted in the 1973 session of the U.N. 
Seabed Committee and was subsequently incorporated in the draft text presented to the plenary at the 1973 
Conference where it was deleted. Nevertheless this shows that the drafters of MARPOL did not intend 
MARPOL rules to be uniform. See also Timagenis (1980) pp. 488-494.  
63 M’Gonigle and Zacher (1979) p. 218; Timagenis (1980) p. 501; Abecassis and Jarashow, (1985) pp. 92-93. 
64 Timagenis (1980) pp. 509-510. The Administration refers to the flag state for ships and coastal state for 
platforms in most cases. This issue was the least controversial of the jurisdictional issues according to 
Timagenis, p 509. 
65 Ibid. pp. 510-515.  
66 Ibid. pp. 515-522. At p. 515 Timagenis underlines that, although coastal state enforcement jurisdiction by 
itself was undisputed, its nature and extent was “… one of the most controversial questions negotiated in the 
1973 Conference.” 
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In addition to article 9 (2) and (3) the 1973 Conference adopted a resolution which stated 
that: 
“… the appropriate forum to deal with the question of the nature and extent of 
states’ over the sea is the […] Conference on the law of the sea,” that; the 1973 
conference had “… a clear intention to leave that question to the […] Conference 
on the law of the sea,” and finally that; “… the rights exercised by a State within its 
jurisdiction in accordance with the Convention do not preclude the existence of 
other rights of that State under international law.”67  
 
The articles 4 and 9, resolution 23, and the drafting history of MARPOL show that 
jurisdictional matters was to a large extent undecided and left to the UNCLOS III 
Conference and general international law. This clarifies the question of residual 
prescriptive- and enforcement jurisdiction as MARPOL gives priority to general 
international law and UNCLOS, thus relying on jurisdictional matters to be dealt with 
under those instruments rather than under MARPOL.68  
 
Based on this examination one is presented with the conclusion that the arguments 
suggesting that the coastal state does not retain any residual jurisdiction seem weak. First, 
the pacta sunt servanda principle and UNCLOS article 311 (2) cannot be interpreted as to 
exclude residual jurisdiction, due to MARPOL giving priority to general international law 
and UNCLOS when there are uncertainties in respect of a jurisdictional dimension of 
MARPOL. Second,  the argument that MARPOL lays down a uniform set of rules that 
cannot be departed from implies that there has been struck a reciprocal ‘package deal’ 
between flag states and coastal states thereby excluding residual prescriptive jurisdiction 
                                                 
67 IMCO Sales No. 74.01.E p. 147. The International Conference on Marine Pollution 1973, Resolution 23 
“Nature and Extent of States’ Rights over the Sea” referred in Timagenis (1980) p. 487.  
68 See Molenaar (1998) p. 111. 
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voluntarily.69 This is quite clearly not the case as article 9 (2) and resolution 23 leaves such 
issues to general international law and UNCLOS.  
 
Third, even though the rules of MARPOL are intended to have a universal purport, one 
cannot disregard the fact that jurisdictional issues shall be dealt with within the framework 
of general international law and UNCLOS, thus in some cases allowing coastal states to 
depart from the rules set out in MARPOL.70  
 
Based on the above it seems justified to conclude that coastal states retain residual 
jurisdiction under MARPOL where general international law, including UNCLOS, allows 
the setting of standards that go beyond the standards of MARPOL.71  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
69 Molenaar (1998) p. 111. According to Timagenis, (1980) p. 503, the Australian delegation at the 1973 
conference submitted, in IMCO document MP/CONF/WP.31, that it seems illogical to accept that “… a 
minority of delegations, by voting to upset a compromise text, could impose on a majority of delegations a 
positive obligation which the majority has made it clear that it will not accept.” 
70 However, the coastal state does not retain unlimited jurisdiction. There are clear limits within the 
framework of UNCLOS, for example GAIRS, and according to Molenaar, (1998) pp. 115-117, a unilateral 
approach has to respect principles such as non-discrimination and national treatment. I addition Molenaar, p 
115, observes that, while not belonging to the domain of law, “… socio-economic and political interests or 
international comity require […] the balancing of interests of all actors involved.” 
71 Timagenis (1980) pp. 488-506; Abecassis and Jarashow, (1985) p. 93; Molenaar (1997) p. 204; Molenaar 
(1998) pp. 111-112 and 211. Commenting on “… the question whether MARPOL discharge restrictions 
constitute obligations for the coastal state …” Ringbom, (1996) p. 77, argues that “… it would seem hat the 
matter is of a purely jurisdictional nature, that is, if there is an obligation for coastal States not to exceed the 
MARPOL standards, this is an obligation which arises from the jurisdictional framework in UNCLOS rather 
than from MARPOL.” 
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2.3 General remarks concerning the Directive 
 
First it should be underlined that the Directive applies to any ship72 irrespective of its flag, 
thus binding its member states whether acting in the capacity of flag state or coastal state.73 
This is an important observation that is common for all the main questions. The Directive is 
first and foremost problematic in that it is applicable to ships flying the flags of non-parties 
to the Directive. Therefore the examinations below are undertaken with the conflict 
between a member-coastal state and a ship flying the flag of a non-member of the Directive 
in mind. The other aspect of the phrase ‘irrespective of its flag’ is that the Directive is 
applicable in relation to ships not flying the flag of states non-parties to the Directive and 
even states non-parties to MARPOL and UNCLOS. 
 
The MARPOL convention recognizes three situations where the discharge standards shall 
not apply. The annexes to MARPOL provide that the discharge standards shall not apply 
when the discharge was “… necessary for the purpose of securing the safety of a ship or 
saving life at sea.”74 Nor shall the standards apply to “… the discharge into the sea of oil or 
oily mixture resulting from damage to a ship or its equipment.”75 The third situation is 
where there is a discharge “… for the purpose of combating specific pollution incidents in 
order to minimize the damage from pollution.”76  The Directive recognizes the first and 
third exception fully,77 but the second situation, which is laid down in the ‘damage 
                                                 
72 According to article 3 (2) of the Directive the following ships are excluded: “… any warship, naval 
auxiliary or other ship owned or operated by  a State and used, for the time being, only on government non-
commercial service.” 
73 Directive 2005/35/EC, art. 3 (2). 
74 MARPOL regs. I/11 (a), II/6 (a), III/7 (a), IV/9 (a), V/6 (a) and VI/3 (a). 
75 MARPOL regs.I/11 (b), II/6 (b), IV/9 (b), V/6 (b) and VI/3 (b). 
76 MARPOL regs. I/11 (c) and II/6 (c). 
77 Directive 2005/35/EC art. 5 (1).  
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exception’78 in MARPOL, is excluded from article 5 (1) of the Directive, thus excluding 
this exception from discharges into the internal waters or territorial sea of a member State. 
 
Article 5 (2) of the Directive, which deals with discharges into straits used for international 
navigation, the EEZ and the high seas, takes ‘damage exception’ into account. Article 5 (2) 
states that a discharge into any of these areas “… shall not be regarded as an infringement 
for the owner, the master or the crew when acting under the master’s responsibility if it 
satisfies the conditions set out in …” regulations I/11 (b) and II/6 (b) of MARPOL.79 The 
respective conditions are that the discharge is a result from damage to the ship or its 
equipment,80 that “… all reasonable precautions have been taken after the occurrence or 
discovery of the discharge for the purpose of preventing or minimizing the discharge;81 and 
except if the owner or Master acted either with intent to cause damage or recklessly and 
with knowledge that damage would probably result.”82 By excluding other persons than the 
owner, the master or the crew the Directive provides that other persons are liable according 
to article 4 while the mentioned persons are not liable if the conditions of the exceptions of 
MARPOL are met.   
 
Main questions 1, 2 (a), 2 (b), and 3 deal with this alleged discrepancy between the 
Directive and MARPOL. Question 1 deals with this in relation to article 5 (2) of the 
Directive which limits the exceptions in regulations I/11 (b) and II/6 (b) to the owners, 
masters and crew acting under the master’s responsibility. In question 2 (a) the claimants 
questions the validity of article 4 of the Directive arguing that it opts for a different test of 
liability than regulations MARPOL’s ‘damage exception’, and question 2 (b) deals with 
                                                 
78 Note that this exception is laid down in annexes IV-VI as well, but only annexes I and II are relevant to the 
Directive. 
79 Directive 2005/35/EC art. 5 (2).   
80 MARPOL regs. I/11 (b), II/6 (b). See also IV/9 (b), V/6 (b) and VI/3 (b). 
81 MARPOL regs. I/11 (b) (i), II/6 (b) (i). 
82 MARPOL regs. I/11 (b) (ii), II/6 (b) (ii). 
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article 5 (1) as it excludes the ‘damage exception.’83 This discrepancy between the 
Directive and MARPOL is also relevant to the third question in that it seems to serve as a 
precondition for questioning article 4’s validity in light of the regime of innocent passage.  
3 Examination of main question 1 
This question raises three issues which need preliminary mentioning. All three issues are to 
some extent common to the examinations in subsections 3.2 and 3.3. 
 
3.1 Issues common to main question 1 
 
The starting point for this question in relation to straits, the EEZ, and the high seas is 
whether the Directive can lawfully deviate from MARPOL. This has been dealt with under 
subsection 2.2.1, which concluded that the coastal state may adopt legislation departing 
from the rules laid down in MARPOL as long as the coastal state legislation is in 
conformity with the relevant provisions of UNCLOS. Thus, the remaining question, which 
will be examined in relation to straits, the EEZ and the high seas in subsections 3.2 and 3.3, 
is whether the Directive is consistent with UNCLOS.    
  
3.1.1 Does article 5 (2) of the Directive represent a deviation from MARPOL? 
 
The first issue is whether or not the exclusion of some persons to the MARPOL exceptions 
in article 5 (2) of the Directive represents an actual deviation from MARPOL. As 
mentioned above, article 5 (2) of the Directive provides that a discharge into straits, the 
EEZ or the high seas shall not be treated as an infringement for the master, owner, and 
crew when the conditions set out in the ‘damage exception’ in MARPOL are satisfied. As 
                                                 
83 The distinction between question (2) a and (2) b is examined in subsection 4.2.1. 
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any person can be penalized for an infringement84 the exclusion of the owner, master, and 
crew in article 5 (2) means that, in respect of discharges into straits used for international 
navigation, the EEZ or the high seas, penalties are applicable to all others than the owner, 
master, and crew if the conditions of the MARPOL exceptions are satisfied, and that any 
person including the owner, master, and crew are susceptible to penalties if the conditions 
are not satisfied. INTERTANKO and others claim that article 5 (2) of the Directive is 
invalid as  
  
“[a] person associated with ships other than the owner, master and crew would 
normally be able to take advantage of these regulations [(the ‘damage exception’ in 
MARPOL)] but loses this right under the Directive on both the high seas and in the 
EEZ. The claimants assert that the Community has no jurisdiction to provide that 
discharges from 3rd country ships caused by serious negligence on the part of a 
person other than owner, master or crew acting under his responsibility (and not 
falling within article 5(1) of the Directive) are to be infringements and subject to 
penalties.”85 
 
The ‘damage exception’ in MARPOL provides that a discharge that otherwise would be 
considered a violation shall be excepted if the discharge resulted from damage to the ship 
or its equipment and all reasonable precautions have been taken unless the master or owner 
acted with intent or recklessly with knowledge that damage would probably result.  
The wording of these regulations suggests that the conduct of the owner and/or master is 
mentioned only as conditions which must be met in order to except an otherwise qualified 
violation of MARPOL, and not as a statement of which persons are susceptible to 
penalties.86 On the other hand, as the exceptions in annex I and II are general exceptions 
                                                 
84 Directive 2005/35/EC art. 8 (2).  
85 INTERTANKO and others v. The State Secretary for Transport para. 32. 
86 This view seems to be in line with that of Timagenis (1980) pp. 454-455. Upon examining the ‘damage 
exception’ Timagenis, (1980) p. 454, argues that the requirements concerning the owner or master are 
established by the ‘damage exception’ since “… this exception relates to unintentional discharges which 
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from MARPOL violations, one could argue that all the persons that can be held liable 
should also benefit from the exceptions. Nevertheless, when giving effect to and applying 
MARPOL, the coastal state must determine which persons can be made subject to criminal 
sanctions in order to enforce MARPOL. Otherwise the obligation to prohibit violations and 
establish sanctions under MARPOL would be undermined,87 and the MARPOL 
Convention would not be applied successfully. Accordingly, the Directive seems to fill a 
regulatory gap in MARPOL and exclusion of certain persons in article 5 (2) should be 
considered as a consequence of this and not as unlawful unilateralism. 
 
3.1.2 Does article 4 of the Directive represent a deviation from MARPOL? 
 
The second issue deals with whether or not the ‘damage exception’ in MARPOL sets a 
standard of liability that must be met in order for the offender to be susceptible to penalties 
for accidental MARPOL violations.88 Mensah argues that article 4 of the Directive is 
inconsistent with MARPOL as it criminalizes serious negligence while MARPOL sets the 
threshold at recklessness.89 If taken out of context the standard of liability in article 4 is 
clearly stricter than the alleged standard in MARPOL. However, the ‘damage exception’ in 
MARPOL only operates with a qualification of the owner and/or masters conduct as a 
requirement for the discharge to be regarded as a violation. Furthermore, any states 
conforming to and giving effect to MARPOL must decide upon what requirement of guilt 
to adopt in order to apply MARPOL successfully and comply with the obligation to 
prohibit MARPOL violations.90 State practice also supports this as several states have 
                                                                                                                                                    
could not be prevented.” Furthermore he underlines that the ‘damage exception’ is “… based on the 
impossibility of the Master and/or Owner preventing the discharge” and does not imply that these regulations 
state which persons are applicable to penalties. This is also in line with Mensah’s, (2005) p. 26, view.  
87 MARPOL art. 4.  
88 This issue is relevant to main question 1 in this section and  main question 2 in section 4.2.  
89 Mensah (2006) p 27.  
90 MARPOL art. 4.  
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adopted a regulatory system imposing criminal sanctions against MARPOL violations 
committed with negligence.91  
 
Thus, the ‘damage exception’ seems to have no impact on the adoption of a requirement of 
guilt in national legislation and does not set a standard that has to be met in order for a 
person to be susceptible to penalties.92 Based on this it seems correct that GAIRS do not 
with the adoption of a standard of liability and the adoption of such a standard is a 
necessity in order to conform and give effect to GAIRS. Therefore it seems unlikely that 
the standard of liability adopted by the Directive is unlawful.   
 
3.1.3 Enforcement issues with respect the Directive, framework decision and 
UNCLOS 
 
The third issue deals with the enforcement of the Directive and its reference to Framework 
Decision 2005/667/JHA.93 The framework decision provides that the criminal penalties 
against natural persons94  “… shall include, at least for serious cases, criminal penalties of a 
maximum of at least between one and three years of imprisonment”95 other than in minor 
cases subject to article 4 (2). Intentional violations shall be punishable by a maximum of at 
least five to ten years of imprisonment for offences with the most serious consequences, 
                                                 
91 E.g. Denmark has criminalized gross negligence, Gold (2006) p. 291; Canada has adopted enactments that 
impose custodial sentences for accidental pollution, Gold (2006) pp. 282-285; Several states in the USA has 
criminalized various types of negligence, Gold (2006) pp. 369-381.  
92 See subsections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2. 
93 See the preamble paragraph 6 and article 4. 
94 Except for the owner, master or the crew in cases of pollution offences committed in international straits, 
the EEZ, and high seas when the conditions set out in MARPOL’s ‘damage exception’ are met (article 5 (2) 
of the Directive). Article 2 (2) of the framework decision reaffirms this in respect of the crew, however, 
without the specification ‘when acting under the master’s responsibility.’   
95 Council Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA art. 4 (1).  
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including the death or serious injury of persons,96 and by a maximum of at least two to five 
years for offences with the less serious consequences listed in article 5. For violations 
committed with serious negligence the custodial penalty can amount to a maximum of at 
least two to five years for offences having the consequences described by article 3 (6) and 
to a maximum of at least one to three years if having the consequences described in article 
3 (7).97  
 
This is problematic as UNCLOS article 230 (2) provides that other than monetary penalties 
only may be imposed in respect of acts of wilful and serious pollution to the territorial sea. 
Even though it is generally agreed that the non-monetary penalties may include 
imprisonment,98 the phrase ‘the territorial sea’ indicates that the coastal state is debarred 
from imposing non-monetary penalties for violations in the maritime zones seaward of the 
territorial sea.99 On the other hand article 4 (8) of the framework decision expressly states 
that article 4 shall apply without prejudice to article 230 of UNCLOS with respect to 
custodial sentences and the discrepancy between article 4 and article 230 is unintended. 
Consequently, one should interpret article 4 narrowly in this regard and as only requiring 
the imposition of custodial sentences for offences committed in the territorial sea. 
                                                 
96 Ibid. Art. 3 (4).  
97 The framework decision does not specifically mention reckless behaviour, but it appears reasonable to 
assume that the provisions dealing with serious negligence also applies to recklessness.  
98 Molenaar (1998) p. 465; Gold (2003) p. 5.   
99 Molenaar (1998) p. 465.  Nevertheless there are examples of national legislation operating with custodial 
sentences against acts of pollution that does not meet the criterion ‘wilful and serious.’ According to Gold 
(2006) Denmark, p. 291, France, pp. 294 and 541-542, and Canada, p. 284, operates with the possibility to 
impose custodial sentences with respect to accidental pollution. 
 27
3.2 In relation to straits used for international navigation and the EEZ100 
 
3.2.1 Prescriptive jurisdiction 
 
The Directive only applies to straits that are subject to the regime of transit passage,101 
which according to UNCLOS are straits “… used for international navigation between one 
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an 
exclusive economic zone.”102 The main provision regarding strait state prescriptive 
jurisdiction is article 42 (1) (b) providing that the strait state may prescribe in respect of 
“… the prevention, reduction and control of pollution, by giving effect to applicable 
international regulations ...”. In respect of pollution into the EEZ article 56 (b) (iii) of 
UNCLOS provides that a coastal state has jurisdiction “… with regard to the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment.” However, according to article 211 (5) the coastal 
state’s prescriptive jurisdiction is limited to conforming and giving effect to GAIRS.103 
Hence, the question is whether the Directive conforms and gives effect to AIRS in 
                                                 
100 The Directive expressly states its intention to be applied in accordance with international law (art. 3) This 
is reaffirmed in respect of straits by article 3 (c) stating that the Directive only applies to discharges in straits 
“… subject to the regime of transit passage, as laid down in [UNCLOS], to the extent that a member State 
exercises jurisdiction over such straits.” Accordingly the Directive is quite clear in giving international law, 
UNCLOS in particular, priority in situations where the rules of the Directive regarding straits would be 
inconsistent with international law. 
101 Directive 2005/35/EC art 3 (1) (c).  
102 UNCLOS art. 37. Straits as described by art. 38 (1) are not subject to the regime of transit passage. 
103 According to Molenaar, (1998) pp. 363-364, the phrase ‘conforming and giving effect to’ implies that the 
coastal state’s prescription is limited to implement the GAIRS and that GAIRS represent both the maximum 
and minimum level of prescriptive jurisdiction, thus states can not apply GAIRS stricter or less stringent than 
provided by the GAIRS themselves. However, there are at least two arguments suggesting that the GAIRS 
only reflect a facultative maximum. First, the ‘all or nothing’ situation implied by the text is probably 
unintended.  Second, the primary purpose of article 211 (5) —to ensure uniformity in international 
shipping— will not be affected as ships complying with GAIRS ‘…would presumably comply with less 
stringent rules and standards.’  
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accordance with UNCLOS article 42 (1) (b) and/or GAIRS in accordance with UNCLOS 
article 211 (5) in stating that any person,104 except the owner, the master or the crew when 
certain conditions are met,105 are susceptible to penalties for discharges of polluting 
substances into straits “… if committed with intent, recklessly or by serious negligence.”106  
 
This begs the question of the meaning of ‘applicable’ and ‘generally accepted’ and the 
relationship between these qualifications. The term ‘applicable’ denotes a specific set of 
rules, however, weather such rules and standards are applicable depends on each 
situation.107 One should interpret ‘applicable’ in article 42 (1) (b) in light of article 39 (2) 
which requires foreign ships in transit passage to comply with GAIRS. Commenting on this 
Molenaar argues that “… it would seem logical that strait States would have prescriptive 
jurisdiction which mirrors the scope of these obligations for ships.”108 This is in line with 
the ILA’s argument that “[w]here for example flag states […] are required, and port and 
coastal states permitted, to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction with respect to GAIRS, it 
would be logical to presume that GAIRS are included within the term ‘applicable.’”109 
Thus, presupposing that the state enforcing the Directive and the flag state are both 
members of UNCLOS the coastal state is limited to conforming and giving effect to 
GAIRS. 
 
With respect to the concept of GAIRS legal theory has been divided by three distinct points 
of view, but at present commentators seem to agree on an interpretation of ‘generally 
                                                 
104 Directive 2005/35/EC art. 8 (2). 
105 Ibid. Art. 5 (2).  
106 Ibid. art. 4. 
107 Ibid. p. 116. Note that ‘AIRS’ is usually used in respect of enforcement jurisdiction while ‘GAIRS’ is 
usually used in respect of prescriptive jurisdiction. See Molenaar (1998) p. 291.   
108 Molenaar (1998) p. 291. See also Hakapää (1981) pp. 203-206 and Vessel-Source Pollution and Coastal 
State Jurisdiction (2001) p. 115 n. 213. Noyes, (2003) p.  203, concludes that ‘applicable’ means the same as 
‘generally accepted’ when modifying ‘international rules and standards.’ 
109 Vessel-Source Pollution and Coastal State Jurisdiction (2001) p. 116. 
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accepted,’ as employed in UNCLOS,110 which they consider consistent with overall 
premise of UNCLOS.111 According to these authors the state parties to UNCLOS have, 
through this convention, agreed to a lower requirement of acceptance than would be 
necessary if the GAIRS should refer to international customary law or IMO conventions.112 
This view encompasses three foundations in which international rules, standards or 
regulations are binding to parties of UNCLOS as long as they reflect UNCLOS’s standards. 
Firstly, it is quite clear that some international agreements constitute GAIRS, for example 
the standards set out in MARPOL.113 Secondly, GAIRS can reflect customary law or even, 
as a third foundation, reflect state practice that has yet to mature into customary law.  
 
The ILA Committee concludes that the concept of ‘generally accepted’ means that the flag 
state of the ship to which the GAIRS is applied does not have to accept the rules and 
standards. A rule or standard should be considered ‘generally accepted’ if sufficient state 
practice supports it.114 Regarding the required level of acceptance the Committee argues 
that it is sufficient that the rule or standard in question is supported by state practice if the 
legal instrument providing it should lack sufficient support.115   
 
                                                 
110 Arts. 21(2), 21(4), 39(2), 41(3), 53(8), 60(3), 60(5), 60(6), 94(2)(a), 94(5), 211(2), 211(5), 211(6)(c) and 
226(1)(a).  
111 Noyes (2003) p. 203; The ILA committee, Vessel-Source Pollution and Coastal State Jurisdiction (2001) 
p. 107, argues that the third view is in line with the ultimate objective of UNCLOS part XII, which is “… to 
make compulsory for all states certain rules which had not taken the form of an international convention in 
force for the states concerned, but which were nevertheless respected by most states.”  
112 According to the ILA Committee, Vessel-Source Pollution and Coastal State Jurisdiction (2001) p. 113, 
this view is represented by Vignes (1979) p. 716; Oxman (1991) pp. 109-159; Sohn (1986) pp. 1074-1075 
and (1998) p. 295; Wolfrum (1999) pp. 231-232. 
113 The ILA committee, Vessel-Source Pollution and Coastal State Jurisdiction (2001) p. 113, observes that  
MARPOL is considered, by some authors, to undoubtedly constitute the GAIRS employed in article 211 of 
UNCLOS .  See also Noyes (2003) p. 203. 
114 Vessel-Source Pollution and Coastal State Jurisdiction (2001) p.112.  
115 Ibid.  
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As it is hard to find evidence of sufficient state practice to argue that the Directive can be 
considered GAIRS this examination seems to support the claimant’s view in the 
INTERTANKO and others v The Secretary of State for Transport case. By referring to 
rules generated at the international level UNCLOS leaves no room for unilateralism116 and 
one must therefore rely on GAIRS/MARPOL’s provisions. Accordingly, if one assumes 
that MARPOL deals with the persons that can be held liable and this is considered GAIRS, 
the Directive would not be conforming and giving effect to GAIRS. Thus, the claim that 
article 5 (2) represents an unlawful deviation from MARPOL in respect of the pollution 
into straits and the EEZ would be justifiable. However, as examined in section 3.1.1, the 
fact that the article 5 (2) of Directive represents a decision of who may be held liable it 
should rather be considered as a consequence of MARPOL being silent on the issue and a 
necessary step in order to apply MARPOL successfully, and not as unlawful unilateralism. 
 
3.2.2 Enforcement jurisdiction 
 
Regarding the coastal state’s enforcement jurisdiction one must distinguish between straits 
and the EEZ. UNCLOS article 233 contains the main provision dealing with strait state 
enforcement jurisdiction allowing strait state enforcement only when a foreign ship is “… 
causing or threatening major damage to the marine environment of the straits.”117  
However, in respect of ships in transit passage the Directive only calls for enforcement in 
port and does not interfere with transit passage at all.118  
 
                                                 
116 Hakapää (1981) pp. 205 and 242; Abecassis and Jarashow (1985) pp. 106 and 110; Molenaar (1998) pp. 
290 and 363. 
117 UNCLOS art. 233. Molenaar, (1998) p. 295, points out that in many cases where enforcement action is 
allowed pursuant to article 233 the coastal state would also have a right of intervention as provided by article 
221. See also Hakapää (1981) pp. 205-206. 
118 Directive 2005/35/EC art. 6 (1) (a) and (b). Art. 7, which allows for more drastical enforcement measures, 
only applies infringements committed in the EEZ committed by ships navigating the territorial sea or the EEZ 
at the time of enforcement.   
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In respect of coastal state enforcement jurisdiction over vessel-source pollution in the EEZ 
UNCLOS article 220 (3, 5, and 6) provides such competence over foreign vessels 
navigating in the EEZ and territorial sea.119 Article 220 (3, 5, and 6) requires the coastal 
state to obtain certain qualities of evidence relating to the magnitude of the damage in order 
to exercise the enforcement actions described in paragraphs (3, 5, and 6) against a foreign 
vessel that is navigating in the EEZ or territorial sea120 and has, in the EEZ, committed a 
violation of international or national “… rules and standards for the prevention, reduction 
and control of pollution from vessels…”. In paragraphs (3) and (5) the level of certainty is 
set at ‘clear grounds for believing,’ while paragraph (6) requires ‘clear objective evidence.’ 
The Directive does not take avail of the enforcement measures available under paragraphs 
(3) and (5)121 as article 6 and 7 only allows for enforcement measures to be taken at sea in 
situations as described in UNCLOS article 220 (6). In all other situations, including those 
laid down in UNCLOS article 220 (3) and (5), the Directive calls for enforcement while the 
ship is in port.122 
 
Thus, the Directive seems to be more restrictive regarding enforcement measures available 
to the coastal state compared to UNCLOS. On the other hand, one could argue that the 
Directive is inconsistent with UNCLOS observing that article 7 (2) of the Directive refers 
to ‘infringement.’ As, inter alia, acts of pollution committed with serious negligence are 
                                                 
119 Article 220 (3, 5, and 6) has a lex specialis status in relation to article 73. See e.g. Kwiatkowska (1989) p. 
181; Molenaar (1998) p. 382; Vessel-Source Pollution and Coastal State Jurisdiction (2001) p. 94.  
120 The phrase “a vessel navigating in the exclusive economic zone or the territorial sea” appears in all three 
paragraphs (article 220 (3), (5), and (6)). See also Molenaar (1998) p. 383.  
121 The Directive only operates with two qualities of evidence (Art. 7 (1) (a) and (b) operates with ’suspicion’ 
while art. 7 (2) operates with ’clear, objective evidence’) and two levels regarding the magnitude of the 
damage (art. 7 (2) operates with damage that causes or threatens to cause major damage. Art. 7 (1) (a) and (b) 
does not specifically mention the seriousness of the damage and deals with damage not amounting to the level 
set in art 7 (2)). 
122 Directive 2005/35/EC arts. 6 and 7. UNCLOS art. 220 (1) stipulates that, in respect of offences committed 
in the territorial sea or the EEZ, the “… State may, subject to section 7, institute proceedings in respect of any 
violation of its laws and regulations adopted in accordance with this Convention or applicable international 
rules and standards for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution …”.   
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considered infringements by article 4, and article 7 (2) does not specify ‘infringement’, one 
must assume that article 7 (2) applies to all infringements as described in article 4. In 
contrast, article 220 (6) of UNCLOS specifies ‘violation’ by referring to paragraph (3), 
which provides that ‘violation’ is to commit “… a violation of applicable international rules 
and standards for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels or laws 
and regulations of that state conforming and giving effect to such rules and standards.”  
 
Hence, the text of article 7 (2) of the Directive deviates from UNCLOS article 220 (6) in at 
least one significant aspect as 7 (2) applies to infringements of the Directive in general, 
while article 220 (6) refers to article 220 (3) which refers to AIRS. However, as concluded 
in subsection 3.1.2, article 4 of the Directive does not deviate from MARPOL and, as a 
consequence the reference to infringement in article 7 (2) is consistent with UNCLOS 
article 220 (6 and 3).  
 
3.3 In relation to the high seas 
 
As examined in subsection 3.2 the UNCLOS provisions dealing with coastal state 
jurisdiction over straits and the EEZ restricts prescription and enforcement to conforming 
to and giving effect to GAIRS. But in respect of the high seas UNCLOS operates with the 
principle of freedom of the high seas.123 
 
The freedom of the high seas is recognized in UNCLOS article 87 and only limited by 
article 92 (1) providing that the flag state enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over its vessels on 
                                                 
123 In the Lotus case, (1927) p. 25, the Permanent Court of International Justice provided that vessels on the 
high seas are only subject to the authority of its flag state. Furthermore, the PCIJ stated that “[i]n virtue of the 
principle of the freedom of the seas, that is to say, in the absence of any territorial sovereignty upon the high 
seas, no State may exercise any kind of jurisdiction  over foreign vessels upon them.” This general principle 
was affirmed in the 1958 Convention of the High Seas and reaffirmed by UNCLOS. See Brownlie (2003) pp. 
238-239.  
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the high seas except “… in exceptional cases expressly provided in international treaties or 
in this Convention.”124  
 
However, the Directive only requires its members to enforce the Directive in cases of 
infringements committed on the high seas where the vessel responsible for the infringement 
is voluntary within a port.125 According to UNCLOS article 218126 a port state is allowed to 
take enforcement measures in respect of vessels violating AIRS, in this case MARPOL,127 
on the high seas.128 The extent of the port state authority under article 218 is questionable 
as it seems to only deal with enforcement jurisdiction.129 One recognized view is that port 
state enforcement jurisdiction presupposes prescriptive jurisdiction and that the very 
existence of article 218 means that the port state also has prescriptive jurisdiction.130 
However, this view is quite controversial. Bodansky argues that, according to this 
interpretation, “… article 218 creates a type of universal jurisdiction…” which is 
inconsistent with UNCLOS’s provisions on port state prescriptive jurisdiction.131 Bodansky 
suggests that article 218 should be interpreted as to limit port state enforcement jurisdiction 
to discharges on the high seas that violates AIRS “… that, by their own terms, apply to the 
vessel in question.”132 Thus, the port state would only have authority to take enforcement 
                                                 
124 The most notable exceptions are arts. 211 (cases of major casualties involving major environmental 
damage) and 218 (see below). Other exceptions include arts. 99 (slave-trade), 100 (piracy), 109 (unauthorized 
broadcasting), 111 (the right of hot pursuit).  
125 Directive 2005/35/EC art. 6 (1) (a) and (b).  
126 For an overview on state practice on article 218 see Molenaar (1998) pp. 109-110. 
127 See subsection 3.2.1. 
128 According to UNCLOS article 92 (1) the provisions of UNCLOS itself may constitute exceptions to the 
exclusive flag state jurisdiction. Hence, indicating that UNCLOS part XII should be taken into account. See 
Abecassis and Jarashow (1985) p. 112.   
129 Article 218 is in Part II Section 6 of UNCLOS which deals with enforcement.   
130 Bodansky (1991) p. 762 n. 219; McDorman (1997) p. 315.  
131 Bodansky (1991) p. 762. The articles dealing with port state prescriptive jurisdiction are 25 (2) and 211 (3) 
and only deals with conditions of entry into port.  
132 Ibid.   
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measures against vessels violating MARPOL provisions if the vessel’s flag state is party to 
MARPOL133 and the level of prescription is limited to conform to MARPOL provisions.134  
 
Based on this interpretation the Directive seems invalid as it applies to any ship, 
irrespective of its flag.135 Nevertheless, there are arguments suggesting that article 3 (2) 
should be interpreted narrowly and that the phrase ‘any ship’ should be interpreted as 
meaning ‘any ship flying the flag of, or subject to the authority of a states party to 
MARPOL.’ First, the Directive expressly states that it shall apply in accordance with 
international law.136 Second, the acceptance of MARPOL is widespread and covers 97, 
98% of the world tonnage137 which makes the “… debate over the applicable international 
discharge rules […] more theoretical than real…”.138 Third, it is possible that all state 
members of UNCLOS has through ratification of UNCLOS accepted “… rights and 
obligations with regard to GAIRS …” .139 Based on this view MARPOL would be covered 
by ‘applicable.’ Fourth, one should take into account that some authors are of the opinion 
that “… there are strong grounds for treating the MARPOL Convention as a customary 
standard to be complied with by the vessels of all states, whether or not they have chosen to 
ratify.”140 Assuming the latter there would be no practical need for a narrow interpretation 
of the phrase ‘any ship irrespective of flag’ as all ships would be subject to MARPOL. The 
                                                 
133 Ibid. P. 763. McDorman, (1997) pp. 319-320, supports this view.   
134 MARPOL is the only multilateral treaty establishing international discharge standards for vessels. See 
McDorman (1997) p. 316. This shows that the view that enforcement jurisdiction presupposes some kind of 
prescriptive jurisdiction is not necessarily correct. In case of article 218 the port state seems to have no 
prescriptive jurisdiction unless it is party to MARPOL. On the other hand some authors, Birnie and Boyle 
(1993) p. 267, suggests that MARPOL is a “… customary standard to be complied with by the vessels of all 
states, whether or not they have chosen to ratify.” 
135 Directive 2005/35/EC art. 3 (2). 
136 Ibid. Art. 3 (1).  
137 By 31 December 2005. See <http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=247>  
138 McDorman (1997) p. 316. 
139 Vessel-Source Pollution and Coastal State Jurisdiction (2001) p. 116.  
140 Birnie and Boyle (1993) p. 267.  
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Claimants in the INTERTANKO and others v. The Secretary of State for Transport Case 
seem to be of this opinion.141  
 
Hence, it is primarily the flag state’s responsibility to enforce violations of MARPOL 
provisions on the high seas, but in respect of the abovementioned situation the port state is 
allowed to prescribe and take certain enforcement measures. It seems unlikely that the  
Directive is in breach of UNCLOS when stating that the “… Directive shall apply […] to 
discharges of polluting substances in […] the high seas”142 and that discharges “… of 
polluting substances into [the high seas] shall not be regarded as an infringement for the 
owner, the master or the crew when acting under the master’s responsibility if it satisfies 
the conditions set out in …”143 MARPOL’s ‘damage exception.’  
 
However, if one does not accept that ‘applicable’ includes MARPOL or that MARPOL is a 
customary standard that binds non-signatories the discussion above suggests that article 3 
(2) should be interpreted narrowly. 
4 Examination of main questions 2 and 3 
 
Main questions 2 and 3 are interdependent as both questions deal with the Directive with 
respect to the territorial sea. As will be explained below Main question 2 deals with article 
4 and 5 (2) of the  Directive in connection with MARPOL, while main question 3 deals 
with article 4 of Directive in connection with the regime of innocent passage as laid down 
in UNCLOS. As UNCLOS contain the overarching principles concerning these issues the 
following examination deals with main question 3 before dealing with main question 2.  
                                                 
141 INTERTANKO and others v. The Secretary of State for Transport para. 36. 
142 Directive 2005/35/EC art. 3 (1) (e).  
143 Ibid. Art. 5 (2). 
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4.1 Examination of main question 3 
 
Article 4 of the Directive applies to any ship, irrespective of its flag,144 discharging 
polluting substances into the internal waters and territorial sea of a member state as well as 
straits, the EEZ, and the high seas.145 Accordingly, the provision applies to ships exercising 
their right of innocent passage through the territorial sea as well as others.  
 
The shipping industry and others claim that article 4 of the Directive deviates from both 
MARPOL and UNCLOS by providing that seriously negligent acts of pollution shall be 
regarded as infringements. They argue that there is no basis in these conventions for such a 
deviation, and that the discrepancy is inconsistent with the regime of innocent passage as 
laid down in UNCLOS. Thus, a state member of the EU would be in breach of its 
obligations under UNCLOS. 146  
 
In order to assess this claim one must examine the nature and extent of coastal state 
jurisdiction in relation to the right of innocent passage. However, the primary question is 
whether or not this kind of legislation brings forth the question of innocent passage at all. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
144 According to the Directive art. 3 (2) the following ships are excepted: “any warship, naval auxiliary or 
other ship owned or operated by a state and used, for the time being, only on government non-commercial 
service.” 
145 Directive 2005/35/EC arts. 3 and 4.  
146 INTERTANKO and Others v. The Secretary of State for Transport, paras 48 to 51. 
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4.1.1 Do the alleged discrepancies between the Directive and MARPOL/UNCLOS 
raise the question of innocent passage? 
 
Ships of all states enjoy the right of innocent passage147 “…through the territorial sea for 
the purpose of: 
(a) traversing that sea without entering internal waters or calling at a roadstead or 
port facility outside internal waters; or 
(b) proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at such roadstead or port 
facility.”148 
As long as the ship is in innocent passage the coastal state shall not “… impose 
requirements on foreign ships which have the practical effect of denying or impairing the 
right of innocent passage.”149 Thus, innocent passage as described in article 18 shall not be 
hampered by the existence of national legislation or the enforcement of national legislation 
except in accordance with UNCLOS.150 
 
Article 19 (2) identifies several activities that a foreign ship must refrain from engaging in 
in order to retain its right of innocent passage.151 One such activity is wilful and serious 
acts of pollution in the territorial sea contrary to the Convention.152 Accordingly, the 
regime of innocent passage provides a right of unhampered passage through the territorial 
                                                 
147 UNCLOS art. 17. 
148 Ibid. Art. 18 (1) (a) and (b).  
149 Ibid. Art. 24 (1) (a).  
150 Ibid. Art. 24 (1). This is reaffirmed by article 211 (4) with respect to prescriptive jurisdiction. See also 
Hakapää and Molenaar (1998) p, 334; Molenaar (1998) p. 201; Johnson (2004) pp. 79-80.  
151 The most plausible interpretation of article 19 (2) seems to be that the list in article 19 (2) is limited to 
activities but that the list of activities is non-exhaustive. See Abecassis and Jarashow (1985) pp. 103-104; 
Ringbom (1996) p. 18; Hakapää and Molenaar (1998) p. 335; Vessel-Source Pollution and Coastal State 
Jurisdiction (2001) p. 57.  State practice supports the latter view to some extent. See Molenaar (1998) p. 235.  
152  Ibid. Art 19 (2) (h).  
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sea for all ships153 as long as the passage is innocent. In respect of acts of pollution only a 
case of wilful and serious pollution can render passage non-innocent and deprive the ship 
of its right to pass through the territorial sea unhampered.  
 
Mensah seems to interpret the criterion ‘wilful and serious’ in article 19 (2) (h) both as a 
requirement for depriving a ship of its right of innocent passage and as a requirement of 
guilt that must be met in order for coastal states to lawfully penalize the offender.154 The 
latter view is quite unusual and difficult to find support for. First, as examined above the 
provisions, context, and purpose of the regime of innocent passage clearly provides that the 
criterion ‘wilful and serious’ only is relevant in respect of the very right of innocent 
passage and thus irrelevant in cases where a vessel is in innocent passage but violates 
coastal state legislation. In addition article 230 provides that a coastal state can impose no 
other than monetary penalties for violations of national legislation. Only in cases of wilful 
and serious acts of pollution may the coastal state opt to other measures. This involves 
recognition of the right for coastal states to impose monetary penalties for other than wilful 
and serious pollution. Consequently, article 230 (2) presupposes that criminalizing other 
than wilful and serious pollution is consistent with the regime of innocent passage. In 
addition there seems to be quite widespread state practice for criminalizing accidental 
pollution supporting this conclusion.155 Furthermore, the view that UNCLOS only allows 
for criminalizing ‘wilful and serious’ acts of pollution is incompatible with the view that 
MARPOL sets the threshold at “… intent to cause damage, or recklessly and with 
knowledge that damage would probably result …”.156 Such an interpretation would 
                                                 
153 There are specific rules for submarines in UNCLOS article 20 and warships and other government ships 
operated for non-commercial purposes in UNCLOS articles 29-32. 
154 Mensah (2005) p. 29. 
155 Gold (2006) pp. 270 and 273-336. See also Barrett and Grasso, (2004) p 154-157, for a list of cases. The 
F/V Hogifossur case in Canada and the Mimi Selmer case in Germany are examples of criminal charges for 
non-intentional offences. 
156 MARPOL I/11 (b) (ii) and II/6 (b) (ii).   
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ultimately bring MARPOL and UNCLOS in disharmony as MARPOL is intended to apply 
to both intentional and accidental discharges.157   
      
Specifically related to the Directive, Mensah submits that the Directive adopts a lower 
threshold of liability than MARPOL and UNCLOS “… whose effect is to hamper innocent 
passage of a foreign vessel through the territorial sea.”158 However, article 4 of the 
Directive only provides that intentional, reckless or seriously negligent acts of pollution 
shall be regarded as infringements of the Directive and not that foreign ships engaging in 
acts of intentional, reckless or seriously negligent acts of pollution will loose their right of 
innocent passage. On the contrary, the Directive expressly states that the application of the 
provisions contained shall not prejudice the provisions of UNCLOS or other applicable 
international law implying that the very right of innocent passage does not cease to exist.159 
In addition, the Directive is more restrictive than UNCLOS in respect of enforcement 
measures available to the coastal state in cases of ships violating national legislation while 
still in innocent passage.160  
 
Consequently, one is presented with the conclusion that, according to the Directive, 
reckless or seriously negligent pollution in the territorial sea of an EU member state is 
regarded as an infringement of the Directive; however an infringement does not 
necessarily161 deprive a ship of its right of innocent passage.162  This feature is not unique 
                                                 
157 See subsection 4.3 for an examination of this.   
158 Mensah (2005) p. 28.  
159 Directive 2005/35/EC art. 9. 
160 Compare article 7 of the Directive with article 220 (6) of UNCLOS. See subsection 4.1.3 for an 
elaboration. 
161 The phrase ‘does not necessarily’ is intended to underline that, although article 4 does not deal with 
innocent passage, an act of ‘wilful and serious’ pollution would be considered an infringement of the 
Directive and as an activity depriving the ship of its right of innocent passage.   
162 Subsection 4.1.3 show that UNCLOS allows for greater interference with passage than the Directive 
without depriving the vessel of the right (of innocent passage). See also Vessel-Source Pollution and Coastal 
State Jurisdiction (2001) p. 88; Johnson (2004) p. 81.  
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to the Directive as most violations of national legislation are not serious enough to render 
passage non-innocent.163 Moreover, this underlines that article 19 (2) (h) of UNCLOS and 
article 4 of the Directive serve different purposes and applies to different situations. Thus, 
Mensah’s conclusion that the Directive hampers the right of innocent passage because it 
operates with test of criminality that does not correspond with the criterion in UNCLOS 
article 19 (2) (h) is unfounded. However, based on an alternative legal basis, the contention 
that article 4 of the Directive is inconsistent with the regime of innocent passage might 
contest the validity of the Directive. This will be examined in subsections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 
below.  
    
4.1.2 Issues regarding prescriptive jurisdiction  
 
The main provision regarding coastal state prescriptive jurisdiction in relation to innocent 
passage is UNCLOS article 21. Article 21 (1) (f) provides that the coastal state may enact 
legislation in respect of “… the preservation of the environment of the coastal State and the 
prevention, reduction and control of pollution thereof” provided that the adopted legislation 
is in conformity with UNCLOS and other rules of international law. While article 19 covers 
‘wilful and serious’ acts of pollution, a category which will render passage non-innocent, 
article 21 covers acts of pollution that does not meet these criteria.164 Thus article 21 covers 
discharges that are; a threat of pollution, accidental, and or does not meet the criterion 
‘serious.’165 However, UNCLOS provides important limits to this broad authorization.  
                                                 
163 Vessel-Source Pollution and Coastal State Jurisdiction (2001) p. 87.  
164Hakapää (1981) p. 190. According to Molenaar, (1998) p. 199 n. 17, Churchill and Lowe, (1988) pp. 79-
80, argues that, although art 21 appears exhaustive, coastal states retain residual jurisdiction. This is based on 
the principle of coastal state sovereignty over territorial waters. On the other hand Roach and Smith, (1996) p. 
233, submit that the list in art 21 (1) is “exhaustive and inclusive.”  
165 Hakapää (1981) p. 190. In respect of the criterion ‘serious’  the Court in the United States v. Royal 
Caribbean Cruises, Ltd (D. P. R. 1997) case did not consider a wilful discharge of  30 gallons (113,59 litres) 
to be a serious act of pollution. Commenting on this Walker, (2004) p. 260, specifies that “… thirty gallons in 
one context might be ‘serious,’ but not so in another.” 
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First, the coastal state is limited to give effect to GAIRS if the legislation applies to the 
design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign ships the coastal state is limited to 
giving effect to generally accepted international rules or standards.166 However, the 
Directive does not deal with design, construction, manning or equipment and is therefore 
not limited by article 21 (2).167  
 
Second, articles 24 and 211 (4) limit the competence conferred by article 21 in that they 
provide that coastal state regulation of ship-source pollution in the territorial sea shall not 
hamper innocent passage. Article 211 (4) specifically mentions the marine environment 
opposed to article 21 which refers to “the environment of the coastal state.”168 Hence, a 
textual interpretation of article 21 read in connection with article 211 leads to the 
conclusion that, in respect of the environment of the coastal state’s territorial sea in general, 
only the limits provided by article 21 applies.169 But in respect of the marine environment 
of the territorial sea, as particularly referred to in 211 (4), the coastal state’s right to 
legislate is further limited by the proviso that “… such laws and regulations shall, in 
accordance with Part II, section 3, not hamper innocent passage of foreign vessels.”170  
Article 24 specifies the term ‘hamper’ by stating that  
1. The coastal State shall not hamper the innocent passage of foreign ships through 
the territorial sea except in accordance with this Convention. In particular, in the 
application of this Convention or of any laws or regulations adopted in conformity 
with this Convention, the coastal State shall not: 
                                                 
166 UNCLOS, art 21 (2). 
167 The wording of art. 21 implies that (1) (a-h) is an exhaustive list, but UNCLOS arts. 27 and 28 implies that 
other areas than those mentioned in art 21 is subject to coastal state regulation. This is in accordance with the 
general premise laid down in article 2 of UNCLOS concerning the legal status of the territorial sea.  
168 UNCLOS, art 21 (2) (h).  
169 According to Molenaar, Molenaar (1998) p. 200, this indicates that “… a coastal state’s competence goes 
beyond that of the marine environment, and includes amongst others the protection of the coastline.” 
170 UNCLOS, art 211 (4).  See Nordquist, Rosenne, Yankov and Grandy (1991) p. 204.  
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(a) impose requirements on foreign ships which have the practical 
effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage [.] 
The wording of  article 24 (and article 211 (4)) does not yield much guidance in 
determining to what extent coastal state jurisdiction is limited by the terms ‘hamper’ and 
‘impair.’ However, the text of article 24 raises one important issue that need further 
examination.  
 
However, article 24 provides that it is not strictly forbidden to hamper innocent passage as 
enactments imposing restrictions are legitimate as long as they are in accordance with 
UNCLOS.171 Articles 21, 22, and 23 provide coastal states with such legal foundation with 
article 21 (2) representing, as mentioned, the most significant exclusion from coastal state 
regulation. Considering that the convention only requires CDEM standards to meet this 
threshold (GAIRS), the impact of other rules and standards can arguably be quite 
significant. By analogy, articles 220 (2) and 25 (3) contribute to clarify the relationship 
between the coastal state’s right to legislate and the right of innocent passage.172 Pursuant 
to article 220 (2) a coastal state may, in accordance with its laws, institute proceedings and 
detain a ship navigating its territorial sea and pursuant to article 25 (3) a coastal state may 
temporarily suspend innocent passage of foreign ships if certain criteria are met. By 
prescribing such laws the coastal state could very well be considered to hamper the 
innocent passage of a ship, but if so, the enactments would hamper innocent passage in 
accordance with UNCLOS. Additionally, as mentioned in subsection 4.1.1, article 230 
recognizes the right for coastal states to impose monetary penalties for other than wilful 
and serious pollution hence, presupposing that criminalizing other than wilful and serious 
pollution is consistent with the regime of innocent passage. Accordingly, the argument that 
monetary penalties against negligence as such is in breach of article 24 (2) contradicts the 
precondition underlying article 230.  
 
                                                 
171 See Johnson (2004) p. 80.  
172 Ibid. See also Hakapää and Molenaar (1998) p. 341.  
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These arguments strongly suggests that the mere existence of the Directive can not be 
considered to hamper the right of innocent passage,173 and it is evident that coastal state 
legislation can have a significant impact on navigation in the territorial sea without 
‘hampering’ innocent passage contrary to UNCLOS.174 This conclusion is in line with the 
overall premise of coastal state sovereignty over its territorial sea laid down in UNCLOS 
article 2 (1).   
 
4.1.3 Enforcement issues 
 
Neither Mensah nor the claimants in INTERTANKO and others v. The Secretary of State 
for Transport raises questions regarding the enforcement of article 4 of the Directive. 
Nevertheless there are relevant issues relating to the enforcement of the Directive that 
should be examined.  
 
The extent of coastal state enforcement jurisdiction over vessel-source pollution in the 
territorial sea is laid down in article 220 (2) of UNCLOS, which provides that that a coastal 
state may undertake physical inspection and institute proceedings, including detention of 
the ship if the coastal state has obtained clear grounds for believing that the ship has 
committed an act of unlawful pollution in the territorial sea.175   
 
The Directive on the other hand calls for enforcement measures against a ship polluting the 
territorial sea to be taken only while the ship is in port. 176-177 The Directive only provides 
                                                 
173 See subsection 4.1.3 for examples from state practice supporting this.  
174 See also Johnson (2004) p. 80.  
175 Article 73 of UNCLOS also deals with enforcement issues but article 220 is clearly meant to be applied as 
a lex specialis to art 73. See Molenaar (1998) p. 382; Vessel-Source Pollution and Coastal State Jurisdiction 
(2001) p. 94. See also Kwiatkowska (1989) p. 181.    
176 This is also the case regarding pollution in straits used for international navigation subject to the regime of 
transit passage and the high seas. See Directive 2005/35/EC arts. 6 (1) and 7 (1) (a) and (b).   
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for enforcement at sea in one situation: If there are clear, objective evidence that a ship, 
navigating in the territorial sea or the EEZ has, in the EEZ, “… committed an infringement 
resulting in a discharge causing major damage or a threat of major damage”178 the coastal 
state may institute proceedings, including detention of the ship.179 If the level of evidence 
only supports ‘suspicion’ the coastal state must wait until the ship reaches its next port of 
call before enforcing the Directive.  
 
As examined in subsection 3.2.2 article 7 (2) is an almost verbatim reproduction of 
UNCLOS article 220 (6). However, the provision deviates from UNCLOS article 220 (6) in 
at least one significant aspect as article 7 (2) applies to infringements of the Directive in 
general, while article 220 (6) deals with violations such as described in article 220 (3).  
However, subsection 3.1.2 and 3.2.2 show that article 4 of the Directive does not represent 
a deviation from MARPOL and it is sufficient for the purpose of this dissertation to assume 
that MARPOL is included in AIRS. 
 
Assuming that MARPOL operates with recklessness as a test of criminality for accidental 
discharges one could argue that article 7 (2) of the Directive is inconsistent with UNCLOS 
article 220 (6). If a coastal state exercises enforcement measures, as provided by the 
Directive, against a ship navigating its territorial sea and that has committed a seriously 
negligent act of pollution to the EEZ, the coastal state avails itself of measures not 
available according to the GAIRS. Thus, the coastal state would be in breach of article 220 
(6) and hamper innocent passage contrary to the Convention and violate article 24.180 
However, MARPOL does not operate with a standard of liability and does not prevent the 
                                                                                                                                                    
177 Consequently, the restrictions of the competence laid down in UNCLOS art. 220 (2) (set by articles 24, 27, 
and 28. See Molenaar (1998) p. 244) will not be examined.  
178 Directive 2005/35/EC art. 7 (2).  
179 Even though article 7 (2) deals with pollution in the EEZ, the provision applies to ships navigating the 
territorial sea and can, as a consequence, have an impact on the right of innocent passage. 
180 Article 24 of UNCLOS applies to both prescriptive jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction. See 
Molenaar (1998) p. 201. 
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Directive from adopting one.181 Consequently, the Directive’s reference to ‘infringement’ 
can not be considered inconsistent with UNCLOS article 220 (3 and 6) and the 
enforcement provisions of the Directive seem to be compatible with the regime of innocent 
passage.182-183  
 
However, the coastal state must observe the obligation not to hamper innocent passage 
through the application of article 7 (2).184 Pursuant to article 24 (2) (a) coastal state 
enforcement is not allowed to have the practical effect of denying or impairing the right of 
innocent passage. This presents the distinction between interference with passage and 
impingement of the very right of innocent passage.  
 
In order to determine whether or not the right itself is ‘denied’ or ‘impaired’ one is, 
according to Molenaar, required to weigh the various interests involved in each case in 
light of the relevant factors.185 A test of reasonableness, in which the principle of 
necessity,186 the principle of proportionality,187 the circumstances, the principle of good 
faith, and the obligation to avoid the abuse of right should be taken into account, 188 might 
play a decisive role.189  The focus of the weighing would seemingly be on the 
                                                 
181 See subsection 3.1.2.  
182 The Directive’s intentions to be in accordance with international law are noteworthy. Articles 1 and  9 
expressly states that the Directive shall be applied in accordance with applicable international law and the 
preamble para. 12 specifically calls for enforcement of ‘article 7(2) infringements’ in accordance with 
UNCLOS article 220. 
183 According to the Claimant’s view on MARPOL and the standard of liability the conclusion would be the 
opposite. Surprisingly the Claimants do not argue that the enforcement of the Directive is inconsistent with 
the regime of innocent passage.  
184 UNCLOS art. 24.  
185 Molenaar (1998) p. 202.  
186 Vessel-Source Pollution and Coastal State Jurisdiction (2001) p. 88. 
187 Ibid. See also Abecassis and Jarashow (1985) p. 87.  
188 UNCLOS, art. 300.  
189 Hakapää (1981) p. 196; Molenaar (1998) pp. 201-202; Vessel-Source Pollution and Coastal State 
Jurisdiction (2001) p. 88.   
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determination of to what extent coastal state laws and regulations burdens navigation, and 
whether or not the enforcement has the practical effect of nullifying or extinguishing the 
right to innocent passage, or are too burdensome to be practical.190  In this regard one could 
argue that the type and level of penalties has the practical effect of rendering passage 
through the territorial sea to burdensome to be practical, for example the imposition of 
exorbitant fines or disproportionate custodial penalties.191  
 
According to Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA the overarching objective in respect of 
penalties is that they shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.192 The maximum 
level of fines against legal persons is set at “… a maximum of at least between EUR 150 
000 and EUR 300 000 [and] of a maximum of at least between EUR 750 000 and EUR 1 
500 000 in the most serious cases, including at least the intentionally committed offences 
covered by Article 4(4) and (5).”193  
 
State practice shed some light on this issue as several states have adopted regulatory 
systems that involve imposition of fines against intentional, and in some cases accidental, 
pollution. Several states operate with the possibility to impose fines which exceed the 
monetary level set out in the framework decision by a great margin.194 As the maximum 
level of fines according to the framework decision is significantly lower than the maximum 
set by the national legislation of several states it seems reasonable to conclude that the level 
                                                 
190 Johnson (2004) p. 81. 
191 According to the Directive penalties other than fines and imprisonment are discretionary and will not be 
examined here.  See framework decision 2005/667/JHA art. 4 (3) and 6 (1) (b).  
192 Council Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA art. 5 (1).  
193 Ibid. Art. 6 (1) (a) (i and ii). In respect of natural persons the framework decision is silent leaving it to the 
discretion of national legislation.    
194 E.g. Spain: EUR 400 million,Gold (2006) p. 326; Ireland: EUR 12.7 million, p. 302; Australia: AUD 10 
million for corporations within the jurisdiction of New South Wales; p. 276, Mexico: Approximately EUR 
8.7 million p. 311; Romania: Approximately EUR 3.3 million p. 320; Portugal: EUR 2.5 million p. 319, pp. 
282-284 and 539-540; Canada: CAD 1 million. However, new amendments provide for higher fines for both 
intentional and accidental discharges, p. 294 and pp. 541-542. 
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of fines adopted by the framework decision does not have the practical effect of rendering 
innocent passage impractical.  
 
In addition to fines the framework decision requires its member states to impose criminal 
penalties of a maximum of at least one and ten years of imprisonment depending on the 
seriousness of the offence.195 The Directive is not a unique enactment in this regard as 
several states have adopted a regulatory system that involves the possibility of imposing 
long term custodial sentences for pollution offences.196 However, the Directive and the 
framework decision are clearly more progressive with respect to imprisonment than with 
respect to the monetary level of fines as it is on par with the most restrictive national 
regulatory systems. Notably, the maximum penalty is reserved for the most serious cases 
involving the death or serious injury of persons197 and the maximum penalty for offences 
having such consequences is substantially lower.198 Accordingly there is little support for 
the argument that the Directive and the framework decision operates with disproportionate 
custodial sentences which have the effect of rendering the right of innocent passage too 
burdensome to be practical. 
 
Even though the Directive is consistent with the regime of innocent passage one could 
argue that the Directive and framework decision is inconsistent with article 230 of 
UNCLOS. According to the Directive’s article 4 the provisions of the framework decision 
applies to infringements of the Directive, including those committed with serious 
negligence. The framework decision requires its members to impose custodial sentences for 
infringements of the Directive which is problematic when taking the safeguards in 
UNCLOS article 230 into account. Article 230 states that other non-monetary penalties can 
only be imposed with respect to wilful and serious acts of pollution. Consequently, the 
                                                 
195 Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA art. 4. See the examination of this in section 6.  
196 E.g. France: 10 years, Gold (2006) pp. 294 and 541-542; Romania: 10 years, P. 320; Mexico: 9 years, p. 
311; Portuga:l 8 years, P. 319. 
197 Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA art. 4 (4).  
198 Ibid. art. 4 (5 and 6).  
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framework decision is inconsistent with UNCLOS when requiring coastal states to impose 
custodial sentences in respect of acts of pollution that are not wilful and serious.199 
However, as explained in subsection 3.1.3, article 4 (8) of the framework decision 
expressly states that article 4 shall be applied in conformity with UNCLOS article 230 with 
respect to custodial penalties. Thus, article 4 of the framework decision should therefore be 
interpreted narrowly with respect to custodial sentences.  
 
4.2 Examination of main question 2  
 
The second issue200 referred to the European Court of Justice by the English High Court of 
Justice201 contains two questions that should be clarified in order to distinguish them sub-
questions 2 (a) and 2 (b).      
 
4.2.1 The distinction between questions 2 (a) and 2 (b) 
 
Question 2 (a) deals with article 4 of the Directive which sets a standard of liability for 
infringements of the Directive. The claimants contend that article 4 is invalid in that it 
operates with serious negligence as a test of liability while MARPOL provides for a higher 
standard of liability in respect of accidental discharges. The question referred under 2 (b) 
deals with article 5 (1) of the Directive which excludes certain acts of pollution from article 
4. According to article 5 (1) acts of pollution that satisfies the conditions set out in 
regulations 9, 10, 11 (a), or 11 (c) of annex I and 5, 6 (a) or 6 (c) of annex II, are excluded 
from article 4. The claimants argue that article 5 (1) is invalid as the application of 
MARPOL regulations I/11 (b) and II/6 (b) are excluded from the exceptions to article 4.  
 
                                                 
199 See for example art. 4 (6) of Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA. 
200 Whether the EU can lawfully legislate for the territorial sea otherwise than in accordance with MARPOL. 
See INTERTANKO and others v. The Secretary of State for Transport, paras. 35-46. 
201 INTERTANKO and others v. The Secretary of State for Transport. 
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One aspect of this interpretation is particularly interesting. The claimants view implies that 
the claimants regard MARPOL as operating with a standard of liability in respect of 
accidental pollution resulting from damage to the ship or its equipment, and in respect of 
accidental pollution in general. What seems to bee the claimant’s case then, is that the 
Directive, by excluding these regulations from article 5 (1),operates with intent, 
recklessness and serious negligence as a test of liability in respect of all ship-source 
discharges of polluting substances into the territorial sea,202 irrespective of the discharge’s 
cause, and any person203 can be held liable.204  
 
Accordingly, both question 2 (a) and question 2 (b) apparently deal with the standard of 
liability as set out in the Directive in connection with MARPOL. It seems like the relevant 
distinction between the questions are that question 2 (a) deals with whether serious 
negligence as a test of liability is inconsistent with MARPOL in general, while question 2 
(b) deals with whether serious negligence as a test of liability is inconsistent with 
                                                 
202 The same applies to the internal waters. However, regulations I/11 (b) and II/6 (b) of MARPOL applies to 
the owner, master or crew when acting under the master’s responsibility for discharges of polluting 
substances into straits used for international navigation, the EEZ, and the high seas. See article 5 (1) in 
connection with article 5 (2)  
203 Article 8 of the Directive provides that “… effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties …”(art. 8 (1)) 
applies  “… to any person who is found responsible for an infringement within the meaning of article 4 …” 
(art 8 (2)). However, article 5 (2) provides that in respect of pollution into other areas than the internal waters 
or the territorial sea “… the owner, the master or the crew when acting under the master’s responsibility…” 
are exonerated if the infringement “… satisfies the conditions set out in Annex I, Regulation 11 (b) or in 
Annex II, Regulation 6 (b) of MARPOL 73/78.” 
204 According to Mensah, (2005) p. 26, the question of who is liable “… may not be particularly significant 
[…] if the Directive is found to be defective in other more important areas.” The question of who is liable is 
raised under the first question referred to the ECJ in the INTERTANKO and others v. The Secretary of State 
for Transport case, see section 6 for an elaboration. However, that question only relates to straits used for 
international navigation, the EEZ and the high seas, while questions 2 (a) and 2 (b) cover the discrepancy 
between the Directive and MARPOL in respect of the territorial sea, and the claimants do not raise the 
question of who is liable in this connection.    
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MARPOL in cases of damage to the ship or its equipment as laid down in regulations I/11 
(b) and II/6 (b). 
 
4.3 Question 2 (a) 
 
In order to examine questions 2 (a) and 2 (b) separately the examination of question 2 (a) 
assumes that the ‘damage exception’ in MARPOL sets a standard of liability for accidental 
discharges resulting from damage to the ship or its equipment despite this assumption 
contradicting the conclusions above.205   
 
Assuming that the ‘damage exception’ in MARPOL sets a standard of liability one can 
observe that the standard of liability adopted in article 4 of the Directive applies to all 
violations of its provisions, while MARPOL only operates with a standard of liability for 
violations of annex I and II in respect of damage to the ship or its equipment. 206 In respect 
of violations of MARPOL discharge standards, that are not a result of damage, the 
Convention does not operate with a standard of liability. Notwithstanding the fact that 
MARPOL is silent in these situations, and that the standard of liability set out in 
regulations I/11 (b) (ii) and II/6 (b) (ii) comes into play regarding accidental pollution, the 
conclusion that MARPOL only is applicable to accidental pollution when the these 
conditions are met 207 is not justified. On the contrary, article 2 (3) (a) states that the term 
‘discharge’ means “… any release howsoever caused from a ship…” thereby including 
accidental discharges irrespective of whether the discharge is a result of damage to the ship 
or its equipment.208 In addition the recitals of MARPOL expressly provide that one of the 
                                                 
205 See subsection 3.1.2.  
206 MARPOL Annex I, regulation 11 (b) and Annex II regulation 6 (b). 
207 Mensah (2005) p. 27.  
208 Hakapää, (1981) p. 97, argues that the term ‘any release howsoever’ in MARPOL art. 2 (3) (a) covers “… 
unintentional pollution resulting from casualties, spills during cargo handling and leakage.” Bodansky, (1991) 
pp. 728-729, specifies that, although discharges means both accidental and non-accidental discharges, “… 
discharge standards are generally directed at nonaccidental [sic], operational discharges such as routine tank 
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main objectives of MARPOL is to minimize accidental pollution.209 State practice also 
support this as several states have criminalized accidental violations of MARPOL.210 
Accordingly, when assuming that MARPOL sets a standard of liability, the discrepancy 
between the Directive and MARPOL would only be in respect of MARPOL violations 
resulting from damage to the ship or its equipment.  
 
As MARPOL clearly applies to both accidental and intentional discharges, and has not 
adopted a standard of liability, the Directive seems to fill a regulatory gap in MARPOL 
rather than deviate from its rules in this respect. Consequently, article 4 of the Directive 
does not deviate from MARPOL in this respect.  
 
4.4 Question 2 (b) 
 
The Claimants argue that the Directive deviates from MARPOL in that it provides that 
wilful, reckless and seriously negligent acts of pollution in general, and irrespective of its 
cause, shall be treated as infringements.211 The ‘damage exception’ in MARPOL on the 
other hand, states that discharges resulting from damage to the ship or its equipment are 
excepted if the requirements set out in regulations I/9 and I/10 and II/5, unless “… the 
owner or the Master acted either with intent to cause damage, or recklessly and with 
                                                                                                                                                    
cleaning and ballasting operations, since accidents are nonpurposive [sic] and hence not amenable to direct 
regulation.” See also Timagenis (1980) pp. 365-366; Molenaar (1998) p. 63 n. 109; Christodoulou-Varotsi 
(2006) p. 379.  
209 The recitals provide that the parties to the Convention desire “… to achieve the complete elimination of 
intentional pollution of the marine environment by oil and other harmful substances and the minimization of 
accidental discharge of such substances.”  
210 E.g. Canada, Gold (2006) p. 282; Denmark, p. 291; France, p. 294; Germany, p. 296; USA, pp. 369-381.  
211 By reading article 3 (a and b) of the Directive in connection with article 5 (1-2) it is evident that the 
alleged discrepancy is caused by the Directive not recognizing the exceptions set out in MARPOL’s ‘damage 
exception in respect of pollution into the internal waters and territorial sea. 
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knowledge that damage would probably result ….”212 Thus, assuming that MARPOL 
operates with a standard of liability in cases where the discharge is a result of damage to 
the ship or its equipment, the Directive is more stringent than MARPOL. As shown in 
section 2.2.1 jurisdictional issues in connection with MARPOL are left to be decided 
within the UNCLOS framework and the Directive is not necessarily unlawful even if 
considered to deviate from MARPOL.213  
 
However, as concluded in subsection 3.1.2, MARPOL does not operate with a requirement 
of guilt that has to be met in order to impose criminal sanctions in accordance with 
MARPOL article 4. Accordingly article 5 (2) of the Directive is not in conflict with the 
‘damage exception’ in MARPOL.  
5 Conclusions 
 
The claimant’s arguments concerning main questions 1 and 2 are based on the assumption 
that MARPOL provides a fixed, binding, and uniform set of rules implying that a coastal 
state cannot enact legislation that deviates from the parameters laid down in MARPOL.214 
Section 2.2.1 shows that MARPOL leaves jurisdictional issues, both with respect to 
prescription and enforcement, to be resolved within the framework of UNCLOS. Thus, 
state members to MARPOL retain residual jurisdiction under MARPOL and one must 
consider the jurisdictional interplay between MARPOL and UNCLOS in order to draw 
conclusions on whether national legislation can lawfully depart from MARPOL provisions.  
 
                                                 
212 Regulation I/11 (b) (ii) and II/6 (b) (ii). 
213 Mensah, (2005) p.  27, supports this conclusion. 
214 INTERTANKO and others v. The Secretary of State for Transport. See for example para. 29.  
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Further the claimants argue that the Directive is inconsistent with and contrary to 
MARPOL with respect to several issues concerning prescriptive jurisdiction.215 Section 3.1 
concludes that the Directive fills a regulatory gap in MARPOL with respect to the issue of 
who can be held liable and the issue of setting a standard of liability as MARPOL is silent 
on these issues. The determination of who can be held liable and the adoption of a standard 
of liability in national legislation should rather be considered necessary in order to 
successfully apply the Convention and in order to meet the requirement to prohibit 
violations of MARPOL.216  
 
While subsection 3.2.1 concludes that the Directive is in conformity with MARPOL and 
UNCLOS with respect to violations committed in straits and the EEZ, the conclusion 
regarding the high seas is less certain. As the Directive applies to ships flying the flag of 
non-signatories to MARPOL one can argue that the Directive is inconsistent with 
UNCLOS article 218. However, most arguments suggest that the Directive is compatible 
with UNCLOS with respect to offences committed on the high seas. If one draw the 
opposite conclusion one should rather interpret article 3 (2) narrowly than consider the 
Directive invalid as the possible discrepancy is marginal.  
 
Concerning main question 3 the claimants rely on Mensah arguing that, even though 
enactments can depart from MARPOL standards, the standard of liability adopted in the 
Directive is incompatible with the regime of innocent passage.217 However, this contention 
is based on an assumption that seems to be wrong as article 4 of the Directive does not deal 
with the right of innocent passage and the criterion ‘wilful and serious’ in UNCLOS article 
19 (2) (h) does not restrict coastal states prescriptive jurisdiction with respect to adopting a 
test of criminality.  
 
                                                 
215 See Ibid. Para. 17 and main questions 1, 2, and 3.  
216 MARPOL art. 4. 
217 INTERTANKO and others v. The Secretary of State for Transport paras. 49-50. Mensah (2005) p.  27.  
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With respect to main question 2 the claimants argue that articles 4 and 5 (2) of the 
Directive are invalid as it imposes sanctions for serious negligence and excludes certain 
persons from the ‘damage exception’ in MARPOL. Recalling the examinations in 
subsections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 this line of argument is found to be based on unreasonable 
assumptions.  
 
The abovementioned shows that the Directive should be considered valid with respect to 
the issues regarding prescriptive jurisdiction. However, sections 3 and 4 show that there are 
several issues concerning enforcement jurisdiction that should be discussed in relation to 
the main questions and that the claimants’ and Mensah’s somewhat one sided focus on 
prescriptive jurisdiction results in neglecting important enforcement issues.  
  
The first observation regarding enforcement jurisdiction is that articles 6 and 7 of the 
Directive are generally more restrictive than UNCLOS. However, subsections 3.2.2 and 
4.1.3 show that article 7 (2) of the Directive seemingly represents a noteworthy deviation 
from UNCLOS article 220, but this deviation is more textual than real and the authority 
provided by article 6 and 7 of the Directive is well within the limits laid down in article 220 
of UNCLOS,  
 
Second, subsection 3.1.3 shows that the enforcement of the Directive, with reference to the 
framework decision, in respect of offences committed in straits, thee EEZ, or on the high 
seas is inconsistent with UNCLOS as article 230 expressly states that non-monetary 
penalties only may be imposed with respect to offences committed in the territorial sea. 
Furthermore, as examined in subsection 4.1.3, the Directive calls for the imposition of 
custodial sentences for serious negligence while article 230 of UNCLOS states that the 
coastal state may only resort to imprisonment in cases of wilful and serious pollution. 
Nevertheless, article 4 of the framework should be interpreted narrowly with respect to 
custodial penalties as article 4 (8) expressly states that article 4 shall apply without 
prejudice to article 230 of UNCLOS.  
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Third, subsection 4.1.3 shows that the Directive arguably hampers the right of innocent 
passage contrary to UNCLOS. However, the legal foundation for this line of argument is 
based on UNCLOS article 24 and not article 19 (2) (h). Nevertheless, the Directive does 
not hamper innocent passage contrary to UNCLOS and there are strong arguments 
suggesting that the Directive does not have the practical effect of impairing or denying the 
right of innocent passage.  
 
Concerning the few situations where the Directive represents a deviation from UNCLOS 
the examinations in this paper suggest that the Directive should be interpreted narrowly 
thus bringing it in conformity with UNCLOS. Based on these conclusions the Directive is 
found to be consistent with both MARPOL and UNCLOS and the Directive should be 
considered valid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.   
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